

Examining India's National Security Semantics -A Theoretical Consideration

Nanda Kishor M S, Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, India and Post-Doctoral Fellow (Erasmus Mundus), Leiden Institute of Area Studies, Leiden University, Netherlands.

Defining what constitutes national security is a herculean task in any part of the world, and in case of India; it is much more complex due to its inherent values of multiculturalism, different schools of thought and differing perspectives on any issue of national importance. This essentially problematizes the very effort of trying to examine India's national security as it may lead to the perception of considering it as vague and even non-explainable phenomenon. The other major problem emanates from the reasoning of what theories should be used to analyse. There are prerequisites to make any analysis requires a readily available document on India's national security in terms of its objectives and strategy. There exists nothing of that sort and that makes this research more complicated. The way to analyse the topic is to observe and analyse India's behavior pattern over a period of time through the prism of different academicians and their interpretations and arrive at some of the conclusions. The concern for the security of a nation is undoubtedly as old as the nation state itself.

Prior to augmenting the central theme of this research it is pertinent to decipher and understand some of the key concepts on which the arguments are built and furthered. Deconstructing the concept of national security would reach to the bottom layer of a term called national interest. National security is principally a subset of national interest. Examining national interest can lead us to understand security and subsequently national security in a much more comprehensive manner.

Reasoning National Interest

Many of the terms in International Relations are heavily contested and the list starts with nation, national interest, security, national security and many more. It is for sure that that no agreement can be reached about its ultimate meaning unlike formulas in mathematics. In a way it is the magnificence hidden within the disciplines of social sciences. Analyzing it from the perspective of the International Relations and Political Science and arriving at some demonstrable variables would be of some help, which otherwise might end up as a futile exercise. Objectively defined through some yardsticks and criteria would allow us to reach the

probable use of it in political action. As an analytical tool, it is employed to describe, explain or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies. Both usages, in other words, refer to what is best for a national society. They also share a tendency to confine the intended meaning to what is best for a national society. Beyond these general considerations, however, the two uses of the concept have little in common' (Rosenau, 1968). The problem with even such definition is that it does not allow us to draw a boundary as to when it is analytical and when it is an instrument of political action. Persons involved in national policy many a times play the role of analyzing it as well as implementing the aforesaid political action. Though there are realist thinkers who are blunt to moral claims of the term and assert that 'the interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of military security, the integrity of its political life and well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality....they are unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either good or bad' (Kennan, 1985). Somewhere these definitions also hint at the political class being entitled to take the decisions that are best for a nation and term them as national interest. There are also academicians like Raymond Aron who differ with these propositions and vehemently argue and conclude after thorough examination that 'the plurality of concrete objectives and of ultimate objectives forbids a rational definition of 'national interest'... .' (Raymond Aron, 1966). Joseph Frankel proposes a new classification for the national interest dividing its usage into three: aspirational, operational and explanatory/ polemical categories (Joseph Frankel, 1970). According to him each set of use will overlap the other, he nevertheless attempts to provide contextual definitions. The aspirational national interest is rooted in history and the country wants to revive that past, operational rests itself predominantly on *specific, measurable, achievable, resourced, and time oriented* concepts and the polemic or explanatory usage essentially does the ground work to justify the actions of the nation as necessity and remain dominant in the intellectual space by using dominant discourse. In other words, "its main role is to prove oneself right and one's opponents wrong" (Frankel, 1970).

Needless to say, there might be several interests depending on the state and the society we live in a country like India. The plurality is much celebrated but there are binding factors which also makes it to look as one unit and then it is pronounced as India. It might be the constitution to which the people of India vow their allegiance and abide by. Though even the

constitution undergoes change through amendments, still it certainly provides a clarity in terms of structure of governance and equally guides through sections such as directive principles of state policy. There have been instances where India has taken completely varied path in the direction of growth from the socialist path it idealized and varied in the 90's, but at large it still continues to be a welfare state. In a vast country like India, however it may sound utilitarian, there is a need to make some distinction between interest as a nation and interest of the individual. The nation may also lack the resources to meet all the requirements and interests of its people. This does not mean that the interest of the nation and the individuals are not complementary. Some interests will certainly receive emphasis and some may have to wait for the suitable time to arrive. This job of making choice on behalf of the national society is left with the policy makers. Though all citizens are capable of making decisions and equally enthusiastic, there is a necessity to keep it to a smaller number to arrive at consensus and the opposition parties are expected to keep the party running the government rational. As Antonio Gramsci opines "all Men are Intellectuals, One could therefore say: But not all men have in society the function of intellectuals. Thus, because it can happen that everyone at some time fries a couple of eggs or sews up a tear in a jacket, we do not necessarily say that everyone is a cook or tailor" (Hoare and Smith, 1971, p. 9). However educated and enlightened society one may be, still it needs to rest some responsibility of the nation in the hands of the policy makers. Decision making is one of the prime duties of statesmanship to know when and how to make such choices of national importance translated to national interest. Moreover, the national interest cannot be equated with a list of state interests, then it can be reduced to the sum of demands by domestic groups. Most of the nations across the world would certainly make a distinction between domestic and foreign interests of a nation. This also in way provides the leverage for the policymakers to make distinction and define national interests in terms of outcomes. Thus national interest of a nation is arrived by prioritizing what is best for the national society to progress and remain peaceful.

Understanding Security

There have been writings from the realist and neo-realist scholars which emphasise on what is insecurity to understand security. Indeed, it is one of the ways of decoding the concept but essentially it believes in the negative image of the international order and push us towards imagining the Hobbesian state. This argument of insecurity essentially comes from quoting Hobbes where he emphasizes 'without security there is no place for industry... no arts, no

letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short' (Oakeshott, 1946). Needless to say, if it were to be true there should have been several wars and bloodbaths throughout, but it is not the case in the Twenty First Century. It is true that one of the meanings of the term security implies freedom from threat but it is a contested concept. The enquiry would move further and demand an explanation as to what is freedom from threat and who's freedom it refers to. Is it individual, national or international security? further, security in what? from what? and to whom? are rarely probed and nation states essentially evade from answering it. It is true that many of the terms revolve around the concept of state. This does not mean that the security means the ultimate security of the state alone. Debates about security have traditionally focused on the role of the state in international relations. Different times with different notions of security have been witnessed and most of the time they are toned in terms of military.

There are scholars who believe that rather than looking security in all ages it is essential to see them through the time frame starting with security in pre, during and after the cold war. This can be highly Western centered model which is often dubbed as the standard format of presenting. But there are no such evidences to show that it has been the same in all parts of the world. For example, nations which got liberated from colonial rule would want least things to be remembered in terms of security under the colonial powers. They would want to count on their experience with security after independence and in this case the standard model might not be sufficient to explain the phenomena. Certainly, the end of cold war changed the notion of security from the heavily state oriented military security to the other dimensions of it and India was also a stakeholder in that. The specific section on national security would deal in detail about it.

National Security

The term security covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies on minimum policing also can be interpreted as policies of security of a state. A normative view of national security is one predicated upon values, ideas and identities. National security is regarded as fundamentally normative because without it human life is reduced to a basic struggle for survival. National security also points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired by a nation state. This statement can be verified by some definitions of national security which echo the terms such as values and core values. Lippmann argues that 'a nation

is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war' (Lippman 1943, p. 51). The definition to a large extent identifies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. India too considers the concepts embedded in the preamble of the constitution as its core values. The problem in accepting the core values to understand India's concept of national security further complicates it. The day to day behavioural pattern cannot be assessed only through the core values she protects. Wolfers opines that 'security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked' (Wolfers, 1962, p.149). There are other academicians who have come with a more docile and social security theory who deem that 'stable security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it; this can be achieved if security is conceived as a process of emancipation' (Booth, 1991, p.319). The instrumental approaches to security largely propounded by realists and neorealist believes in outcomes in the form of policy and actions and tries to break away from the moral dilemmas embedded in the normative sense of security. but it is extremely difficult to comprehend as to what extent people are happy only due to some policy. Even if there is a policy it is a methodological challenge to measure it.

Wolfers termed the word National Security as an ambiguous symbol. He wrote this when people had lost hopes of researching on national security due to its vagueness inbuilt and arguments becoming endless. Wolfers did not dismiss the concept as meaningless or hopelessly ambiguous, but he was concerned about the ambiguity of national security. 'It would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, though closer analysis will show that if used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford' (Wolfers, 1952, p.483). This sounds sort of a political jargon but there is much more to what he observes. Morgenthau termed national security as "the integrity of the national territory and its institutions" (Morgenthau, 1948). The need to safeguard an accepted political system, society and its people has also become primordial to the overall national security architecture. But what complicates it further is the problem associated with the term national security itself as it does not offer itself to a precise definition. There is also nothing called *The National Security*. It also moves through the time swiftly apart from regular

ideational perspectives on freedom from external and internal threats to sovereignty of a nation. Without doubt, over a period of time, there has been a discourse heavily revolving around the realist interpretation of national security which is essentially associated with defense and survival of the state which is also often dubbed as the military and state centric security. As mentioned in the previous section, there is semantic confusion all over in terms of understanding security as equivalent to defense and military. This view was accepted all over the world until the wave of globalization started creeping in several parts of the world. For common man, there is an utter poverty in these connotations in day to day life. As there are no major wars happening in any part of the world and there are no such anticipations of any in the future too has led to suspicion on the state itself. The state is suspected to be working and using the state centric approach to keep itself in the center of discussion. As Brown opines 'it is used to justify the maintenance of arms, the development of, new weapon systems, and the manufacture of armaments. The overwhelmingly military approach to national security is based on the assumption that the principal threat of security comes from other nations' (Brown, 1977, p.5). Brown's contentions are clear, relevant and continue to find their space for the years to come. Ullman views 'national security as more than a goal with different trade-off values in different situations' (Ullman, 1983, p.129-153). But this military and state centric notion of national security comes with an extreme cost. This was anticipated by Adam Smith two centuries ago. He opined that national security is an expensive activity and demands the allocation of resources that are likely to remain unused. This is true for sure as most of the countries who top the list with their defence acquisitions are suffering from this problem and India too is in the spree. Many a times countries like India have justified acquiring weapons due to the 'security dilemma' they go through which is an essential source of conflict between states leading to the hyper notion of national security. In fact Wolfers has befittingly termed it as *hysterical apprehension*. This is due to the reaction of nations to the external situation of the country and its geopolitical position. Any threat perceived, some tend to exaggerate on the one hand and some underestimate it on the other. Objectively defining national security of a country may not be able to explain it all the time. These type of situations demand subjective reaction as there is lot more to be imagined, analysed and involves great deal of perception. This leads to the problem which is double edged. If we assume the objective sense of national security, it may not lead to positive results anticipated in extraordinary situations. On the other hand, there is no guarantee inbuilt in subjective analyses in extraordinary situations which would bring success. If there is a minimal success

in subjective understanding of national security, it would certainly lead to massive procurement of arms and ammunitions reminding us of Adam Smith who said that they may never be used. 'In any case, together with the extent of external threats, numerous domestic factors such as national character, tradition, preferences and prejudices will influence the level of security which a nation chooses to make its target' (Wolfers, 1985, p. 45). This is the reality even in the Twenty first century with all the nations across the world.

This ambiguity is not just with one nation or few in the world. It is universal and has been dubbed by many scholars as one other concept which would keep the academicians busy all over the world. Though marked by considerable ambiguities and fuzziness (Buzan, 1991) the concept of national security did provide a dominating strand of security analysis, one that tended to equate "security with the absence of a military threat or with the protection of the nation from external overthrow or attack" (Halftendorn, 1991, p.3-18). Depending on the conditions in which the country is treading, it has been observed that states who still largely favour the state as *the* important and revolve around traditional notions of security tend to favour established realist and liberal approaches developed during the last century. But in contrast, some of the nations which have moved beyond the notions of the traditional approaches have shown large interest in unconventional and broader definitions of national security which include environmental security, economic competitiveness, human rights, or human welfare as an alternative analytical perspectives to asses themselves. Several argue that this is due to globalization and its ability to percolate to most of the nations. The differing view to such notion is, at that superficial level there is no doubt that one would be forced to believe that globalization has blurred the borders and the heavy reliability on the traditional notion of security. A close and in-depth scrutiny of the process of globalization would reveal the new security state which is emerging on the premises of neoliberal thought of demanding more freedom for economics to pay in the forefront. Rather than speaking in terms of becoming a arms acquiring state for the sake of projecting power, now the state is acquiring new weapon technologies and buying arms in the name of protecting its economic freedom and those of the others who have invested in their country. Interesting examples emerge from several nations where to protect the maritime boundary and the movement of the goods the countries are building their arsenal heavily. Surveillance in the name of protection has become the order of the day in the disguise of enabling security for the people.

India, in the post-colonial period struggled to work on everything from identifying her friends to enemies. There were no consensus on how the state would want to be. Nehru, the first prime minister had his own set of national goals starting with national unity, parliamentary democracy, industrialisation, socialism, development of the scientific temper, secularism and nonalignment (Parekh, 1991, p.1-2). This adequately does not speak of the national security and such importance was not given to the traditional notion of security of that time though the Indian military had won an important war with Pakistan in 1947 itself. Many have scathingly attacked India of not having a national security doctrine or a document due to its weak strategic culture and the leading one being George Tanham. Though his understanding has been criticized by few scholars, the reality needs to be embraced by understanding and accepting the history. The strategic culture or thought was interrupted several times due to the invasion by some of the external powers for centuries together. Essentially, strategic thought is also a civilizational value which travels with the coming generations and there have been situations where it did not find conducive regimes to flourish. The fractured strategic thought had its complete change over during the British rule. Occupying the mind space was the ultimate victory for the British as it would serve the purpose of keeping people slaves not just physically but would become the symbol of victory for the British empire even after their departure from India. It is extremely difficult to understand India's behavior to term what has been its understanding of national security due to its compatibility to the age old realism of Kautilya through Arthashastra and to the latest being concept of non-reciprocity of Gujral. Generally used theories for analyzing India's national security such as structural realism, liberalism or constructivism may be not be sufficient to explain all the traits of India and its perception of national security. India has not relentlessly pursued a hegemonic policy when structural conditions were conducive to her and allowed domination. The most cited examples is that of victory over Pakistan and liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 (Cohen, 2002, p.32-60). The concept of strategic restraint has held her in much more control (Cohen and Dasgupta, 2010). It also equally reminds some more incidents which are hard to comprehend and analyse India's behaviour such as India's withdrawal from Sri Lanka in 1990 and exit from Maldives in 1989 without consolidating power to boost its national security. In the first case with regard to Sri Lanka it succumbed to the pressure of Tamils at large but this would also take us to the fundamental question: why India could not imagine such a situation forthcoming at the very outset prior to making a decision to move in? could not she understand her own domestic situation? was she in such dearth of strategic understanding?

Was it not too obvious?. The second case, India could have played very constructive role and could have added lot of strength to her own consolidation of power which could have got translated to its better position in the SAARC meetings. These two examples apart, India also has some examples to show that she does not fall only under the category of a defensive realist state. The takeover of Goa from the Portuguese in a successful combat codenamed 'Operation Vijay' was condemned by the United States and six others including the British made no impact on India. The Indian representative at the UNSC declared 'Charter or no Charter, security Council or no security Council' that Goa, Daman, and Diu are inalienable part of India unlawfully occupied by Portugal'. This event being one of the most successful by India in projecting its strength to protect its national security is a startling example of her strategic culture. India continues to host Dalai lama being aware of the tensions with China. It does not also fit into the liberal strategy too as it does not follow the ideals of countries like United States which are always in the run for spreading democracy in as many countries as possible irrespective of the returns. India has not tried ever to spread its democratic credentials to even its neighbours who are less powerful. This is quite strongly advocated by scholars like Mehta who opine that 'policies that are too norm driven will make problematic countries even harder to engage. Thus, despite India's own democratic example and sense of desirable regime forms, it is unlikely to sign on to democracy promotion as a *big idea*' (Mehta). Apart from these, India is fiercely combating the naxal movement yet is offering them space for joining the mainstream to achieve peace makes it tough to understand her national security objectives. As Wolfers points out to national character, tradition, preferences and prejudices being great influence on national security character of a nation is befitting to understand India. India's behavioural pattern can be best understood under three schools of thought named as *Nehruvianian Idealism* (moving beyond nation and adopting world view), *liberalists* and *hyper nationalists* by adopting it to reconstruct the national security thought.

The first school of thought, Nehruvianian Idealism is characterized by traits such as Nehruvian world view predominantly which is cooperative in nature. It emphasizes that India should be able to defend itself from its enemies but should not dispose of so much force that it frightens others. Emphasizes on a multifaceted process of communication and contact to solve national security issues. Indian exceptionalism on issues involving national security issues might have suited Nehru's world view and his statesmen traits but they essentially did not go great with India's national security. Seeking the moral high ground on most of the issue hurt

India in her initial years which have continued to haunt India even today. The strategic decisions have had great impact on India's geopolitical position and its maneuverability on India's national security issues. May it be Kashmir or Sino-Indian issue or even that of Tibet. Nehru could not make distinction between idealism and utopianism in many of his decisions. Nehru grappled with challenges of domestic nature, he hoped India's new-found independence and freedom would galvanize her to rise to greater purpose on the international scene. His desire to become champion of the third world blinded him to the essential national security objectives of India, rather, his focus was on national goals which do not speak anything on national security per se. The decisions taken by Nehru during his long tenure were not essentially that came from consensus rather by his own imagined self-merit. Some of the strategic thinkers like K. Subramanyam have summed up his personality as 'on the whole, Nehru's attitude must be summed up as of one who wanted to avoid war, who abhorred it, yet who would not hesitate to fight to defend his country's interests, in this he was like many western liberal statesmen and thinkers'(Subramanyam, 1976, p.106-107). There are other observations made by some scholars who opine differently on Nehru especially on Sino-Indian war being one of the major blow in the history of India 'Nehru was right when he spoke in the early 1950's about India and China being blessed with an absence of possible grounds of conflict, claiming to envision a future of Sino-Indian amity. It was his own irrational, self-defeating policies-his folly-that doomed that aspirations, and their lasting effect leaves the two huge powers still estranged, with festering enmity against China harbored by the Indian political class, first duped, now self-deceived' (Maxwell, 2003, p.112). Subramanyam drubbing Maxwell wrote that the concept of forward policy was not anyway a fault by Nehru. Needless to say whether pro or against Nehru, the argument is very well taken that he as an individual and as a personality shaped tenets of India's national security around his own beliefs. This is being accepted even by Subramanyam knowingly or unknowingly in one of his work regarding Sino-Indian war of 1962 which says that 'history will record that Jawaharlal Nehru's perception of India's problems of security was accurate. The policies he pursued were also perhaps the best under the circumstances. But he failed partly in their implementation and partly for reasons which could never have been anticipated, such as the local command failure in the 1963 war. If we take into account the magnitude of the crisis that India faced, it would seem that Nehru pulled her through it at a relatively low cost'(Subramanyam, 1976, p.130). Some scholars from the liberalist tradition dispel the aura around Nehru in some of their writings. They opine that 'though no one doubted Nehru's

sincerity, many questioned the correctness of his policy. Yet no one had the courage to defy him either out of respect for his position or for the fear of becoming unpopular and losing positions of power' (Narayanaswamy, 2001, p.34). The nonexistence of *realpolitik* in the policymaking as well as the limits of Nehruvian idealism was apparent in many instances. The thought of Nehruvian Idealism laid the foundation for several decisions taken in future too regarding India's national security. In fact, one can even say, the strategic restraint found its birth in the post independent India through Nehru.

The second school of thought constitutes the liberalists who believe in individual liberty, free trade (not all as few liberalists have adopted the Indian version of liberalism), and moderate political and social reform. The liberalists heavily rely and stress on human rights and democracy. They have a different notion of security and are often dubbed as less nationalistic and less patriotic by the hyper nationalists. For liberalists, the human nature is basically good and that innate goodness makes societal progress possible. States are, and always have been, embedded in a domestic and transnational society, which creates incentives for economic, social and cultural interaction. Evil or unacceptable human behavior, such as war, is, according to liberals, the product of inadequate or corrupt social institutions and of misunderstanding among leaders (Mingst, 2003). The regulation regime and high value given to the rules, acts and security is not very well accepted though they respect all of these when they are minimal and mild. Though initially even Nehru was a liberalist soon he moved towards championing socialism. One best example to differentiate between Nehru's ideology and liberalism is Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari's anecdotes and his life. Though Nehru and Rajagopalachari were together during the freedom fight, soon after independence Nehru's obsession with Socialism troubled Rajaji and his colleagues and they went on to start a new political outfit called Swatantra Party opposing Nehru's policies. In fact 'Rajaji was the first person to hoist the flag of open revolt against Nehru's policies (Narayanaswamy, 2001, p.34)'. Still scholars like Ramachandra Guha hold Nehru as a liberalist as against the group of scholars led by Partha J Shah. To be precise, the Congress party led government in India and its leadership at different intervals starting with Nehru until recently to Manmohan Singh have been a confused lot. Unlike Nehru, Narasimha Rao and Manmohan thought that it is best to be liberals by including the trade component to it. This might be one of the main reasons Manmohan Singh struggled with the issues of national security. At the most he did was to condemn them. The liberalist thought in India thinks that the inherent value of rationality will

work and there is no need of intervention of the state every time on every issue. The fact that needs to be emphasized here is that the Liberalists need certain conditions remaining constant to flourish. This has led to a tension between the liberalists and nationalists. If the country is strong in its foundation and is a stable state, there are best possibility of liberalist tradition to embellish. The problem with a country like India since its independence till date is that of its security. Volatile boundary issues with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh have always demanded a strong state and concurrent laws to deal with it. The politics of welfare state and planning also to a large extent remains as an irritant to the liberals. Needless to say, the liberals had their time, but were always threatened by the hyper nationalist thought.

The third school of thought consisting of hyper nationalist is the right wing of India. Though on the surface they appear to be the most unpopular among the intellectuals, their stand is always clear and straight forward. The hyper nationalists do not want any compromise on security of the state. For them the motherland becomes the most important. They also demand strong action against the nations opposing India like Pakistan. It is to be noted that the hyper nationalists derive their ideology from organisations such as RSS, VHP and Bajarang Dal which base themselves on protection of Hindu religion essentially invoking motherland as part of it. They always have an opinion that India was glorious but was looted and brought to a bad situation because of invaders. Revival of the past glory seems to be one primordial idea, be it Sanskrit as a language or heroes of mythology. The striking change in their path is the interest they have been showing with regard to the neo-liberal culture towards commerce but equally conservative in terms of culture as such. Possessing strong military and strong reaction to perpetration by the enemy remains as the fundamental of their imagination of national security. Hindu nationalists have also generally been more hawkish, calling for a commitment to military strength and often favouring the use of force and have been advocating the acquisition of nuclear weapons since the 1960's. Though they have had chance to be in power only twice including the present regime, they have been vocal in their approach to India's national security. Many academicians term hyper nationalists as realists. There are scholars who make a distinction and opine that 'where Hindu nationalists depart with Western realists like Thucydides, Morgenthau, and Waltz is with their insistence that for a country to be strong it must cultivate a strong sense of national identity'(Panda, 2014). The hyper nationalist group always uses the instance of India going fully nuclear in 1998 under Vajpeyee's regime as their symbol of nationalism. The present government led by Narendra

Modi is also seen as a continuing stream of Vajpeyee's legacy but with some changes such as high importance to trade, make in India, unleashing the soft power strength of India and quick decision making process. Though there have been few instances to prove the rhetoric to reality, they have been significant from India's national security point of view. The retaliation to the actions of Pakistan would remain as a good example. The economic times reported saying 'in another example of how decision-making process has changed under the BJP-led government, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not convene a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) before deciding to aggressively retaliate to Pakistan's shelling last week. The decision was taken by Modi himself in consultation with National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval'. This is exactly the result the hyper nationalists have looked forward under Modi's leadership. His criticism of the previous Prime Minister's national security policy during the electoral campaign as "weak where we needed to be strong, insensitive where we needed to be sensitive" can be aptly recalled. Modi and his team branded as hyper nationalists due to his background have no hesitation to accept that India has been timid in relations with China and weak on counterterrorism and cyber warfare (Nanda, 2014, p.13). The coming five years, India will witness the hyper nationalists at the helm of affairs on decisions pertaining to India's national security.

There is a flaw in each of the school of thought as they suffer from one or the other type of extremity. One needs to also make a distinction between the notion of national security that was prevailing in India before 2000 and later. The policy makers have realized that the traditional security paradigm does not address the rapidly growing nontraditional threats to security like: The struggle for resources embedded in the pursuit of energy, security, environmental degradation, forced migration, international terrorism, insurgency ascendancy of non-state actors in drugs, arms, money laundering and financial crime organization. The previous National Security Advisor of India (NSA) asserted that "We now need to consider our energy security, food security, technology security, and social cohesion and institutions, to name just a few, when we think of national security" (Menon, 2013). This understanding has essentially come in India much later than some of the developed countries from the compulsion that national Security requires a stable economy with assured supplies of materials for the Industry. In this sense, frugality and conservation of materials are essential to national security. Security means more than safety from hostile attacks, it includes the preservation of a system of civilization (Romm, 1993, p.54). Something that we have all been

witnessing has been the change in the mind set from the strict monoculture and sacrosanct traditional notion of security meaning military dimensions of national security being changed to include other non-military aspects of security in India. Think tanks and academicians working on strategic studies have started accepting this definitional change happening in a subtle way. One of the best examples that can be cited is the subject of climate change and environmental security which has almost become part of all the institutions working on strategic studies. This is a welcome alteration in an era where the possibilities of physical war is meager. It is high time such several aspects which have influence on national security should be taken in to consideration as the expected standards in notions of national security has to be multidimensional, integrated, interest-based and not threat-based, grounded in hope, not fear, pursued inside out, adapted to the information age. In the verge of making the world a better place to live by hoping for peace and make wars and conflicts scanty, there is a necessity to move beyond the national security discourses surrounding national interest and security of individual country. No national security is comprehensive in the world without considering the global threats as we live in a world of complex interdependence and each other's action can cause equal amount of damage as well as bring positive results equally.

References

- Acharya, A., 1995. *The periphery as the core: The third world and security studies*, s.l.: YCISS.
- Aron, R., 1966. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
- Ayoob, M., 1995. *Regional Security and the third world: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International system*. New York: Lynne Rienner.
- Bajpai, K., 2002. Indian Strategic Culture. In: M. R. Chambers, ed. *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*. Carlisle, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute.
- Beard, C. A., 1996. *The idea of the National Interest*. Chicago: Quadrangl.
- Brown, L. R., 1977. "Redefining National Security.. *Worldwatch Papers*.
- Buzan, B., 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Er*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Cohen, S. P., 2002. India, Pakistan and Kashmir. *Journal of Strategic Studies* , pp. 32- 60.
- Dasgupta, S. P. C. a. S., 2010. *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernisation*. New Delhi: Penguin Viking.

- Frankel, J., 1970. *National Interest*. London: Pall Mall Press Ltd.
- Halftendorn, H., 1991. The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security. *International Studies Quarterly* , pp. 3 - 18.
- Hobbes, T., 1946. *Leviathan*. oxford: Basil Blackwel.
- Marshall, C. B., 1952. National Interest and National Responsibility. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* , Volume 85.
- Maxwell, N., 2003. Forty Years of Folly. *Critical Asian Studies*, pp. 99 - 112.
- Mehta, P. B., 2011. *Journal of Democracy*.
- Menon, S., 2013. *Raja Ramanna Memorial Lecture: India's External and Internal Security*. New Delhi: s.n.
- Mingst, K., 2003. *Essentials of International Relation*. New York: W W Norton & Company.
- Morgenthau, H. J., 1948. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Narayanawamy, G., 2001. Rajaji: Man with a Mission in profiles in Courage: Dissent on Indian Socialism. In: P. J. Shah, ed. *Profiles in Courage: Dissent on Indian Socialism*. New Delhi : Centre for Civil Society.
- Parekh, B., 1991. Nehru and the National Philosophy of India. *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp. 1-2.
- Renner, M., 1989. National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions. *Worldwatch Pape*.
- Rosenau, J. N., 1986. National Interest. In: D. L. Sills, ed. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan Free Press.
- Rothschild, E., 1995. 'What is security?'. *Dædalus*, pp. 53 - 98.
- Smith, Q. H. a. G. N., 1971. *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Subramanyam, K., 1976. Nehru and the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 . In: B. R. Nanda, ed. *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawai.
- Ullman, R., 1983. Redefining Security. *International Security*, pp. 129 - 153.
- Wolfers, A., 1952. National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly* , Volume 67.