Changing Trends in US-Saudi Relations
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There were four important phases identified in the relationship between the United States, the world’s only superpower, and Saudi Arabia, the strategically important regional power in the Middle East. The presence of the world’s most precious and scarce commodity, oil, in Saudi Arabia was the most important influence in the establishment of these relations. The real challenge for the United States was to establish a consistent and constant relationship with a country which had lived in comparative isolation, with its own strict interpretation of Islam. This physical isolation had helped the Saudi family to use force, persuasion and religion, hand in hand, in unifying the peripheral areas to form the present-day kingdom. What helped the United States in establishing a successful dialogue with the Saudi Kingdom was the uncertain future and apprehension of Saudi Arabia in coping with the new challenges in the region. Saudi-American relations remained purely commercial in the early years of this relationship with the Standard Oil Company of California (CASC0) playing a prominent role in carving out lucrative oil deals. The Second World War and the subsequent creation of Israel ironically played influential roles in elevating Saudi Arabia as an important ally of the United States in the region. It is to the credit of the oil-rich kingdom that it managed to use its influential position and carve out a space for itself by pushing the commercial relations into other spheres like military, diplomatic, technical and economic contacts. Saudi Arabia used the American necessity for oil to increase its revenues, which in turn helped finance the infrastructure of the modern-day kingdom. It was also the increasingly intricate relationship in the oil sector that led to the establishment of OPEC by the oil-rich Arab countries. Perhaps the most puzzling factor was the continued ambiguity that existed between the two countries in spite of increased oil contacts. The oil crisis of the early 1970s followed by the threat to use oil as a weapon by Saudi Arabia in resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute in its favour were prominent instances of hostility creeping in.

However, such incidents did not dampen the flurry of contacts established in other spheres. The strategic location of Saudi Arabia between the vital Red Sea and the Persian Gulf shipping routes and across the direct air route to India and the Far East for the United States and the constant external threat that Saudi Arabia faced ensured a robust military partnership. The advent of a modern Saudi Army and the “Two-Pillar Policy” of the United States in propping up Saudi Arabia and Iran to fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal from several of its colonies helped place the military relations on a firmer footing.

The establishment of economic relations was influenced by the forging of oil relations. Saudi Arabia was clearly the beneficiary among the two as far as the burgeoning economic contacts were concerned. It saw the evolution of the oil-rich kingdom into a major oil producer (1933-73) and then, following the energy crisis of 1973-74, the country suddenly emerge as a major regional power.

The early phase of economic relations involved only the American private sector with the odd intervention of the government on their behalf. But following the Second World War, the American Government, partly on its own initiative, began offering technical assistance. The Eddy-Mikesell mission to look at currency reforms and the John E. Greany-designed income tax system under the “point four agreement” were signed in 1951. A Financial Mission under Arthur Young was sent to reform the budgetary and administration system of the Saudi Ministry of Finance and to improve the tariff system. The biggest success was the creation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 1952 to operate the kingdom’s Central Bank. Ironically, all the initial economic assistance ultimately forced the United States to make various domestic legislations to hit back at the threat of the Saudi oil weapon. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Export Administration Act amendments of 1977, he Economic Recovery Act of 1982 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 were avenues for making a political statement in support of Israel and an irritant to Saudi-US relations.

Economic, commercial and military relations contributed significantly in establishing a firm political relationship between the two countries. The famous meeting of King Abdel Aziz and the then American President, Franklin Roosevelt, in 1945, the American role in negating the Suez crisis in 1956 and the compulsions for a close partnership in ending
Yemen's civil war in 1962 went a long way towards improving the political relations.

Yet the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, the threat of an oil embargo by Saudi Arabia followed by the first oil crisis and the fall of the Shah in the Iranian Revolution led to the deterioration of political relations by the late 1970s.

The United States, while continuing to cold-shoulder Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, did not completely distance itself either as it had realised the importance of Saudi Arabia in the region especially after the fall of a close ally, the Shah of Iran. It went on providing a significant number of troops, AWACS and F-15 aircraft to defend the kingdom despite Israeli opposition.

Persian Gulf War

The world's first post-Cold War crisis severely tested the foundation of the US-Saudi relations built over the previous decades. This event, which precipitated a global crisis, was pivotal for several reasons. First, Iraq's aggression was unprecedented. Never before in the twentieth century had an Arab state occupied and subsequently annexed another. Secondly, the Gulf War was the first regional war fought against an Arab state by a coalition of Western and Arab countries with Israel's backing. Thirdly, Saudi Arabia's assertiveness during the war even extended to the point of a public condemnation of Iraq's launching of Scud missiles against Israeli cities; one Arab regime had never condemned another for attacks on Israel. Fourthly, for the first time in the twentieth century, non-Muslim, Western military forces launched an offensive against an Arab country, using Saudi Arabia as a launch-pad. Despite legitimisation of the offensive by some Muslim religious authorities, other Muslim clergy and activists considered the Saudi role blameworthy. Fifthly, unlike previous wars, this war produced a popular reaction that was neither uniform across the Arab world nor consistent from the beginning to the end of the crisis. The Arab world was badly divided over providing support to the international coalition's war against Iraq.

An important determinant that forced the United States to go to war against Iraq was also to defend its oil supplies in the Gulf. The Saudi invitation to American troops was extraordinary considering that the United States was the main supporter of Israel. Yet the invitation was due to the panic of an imminent Iraqi invasion directed against the populace that swept Saudi Arabia. For the United States the desire for a New World Order also necessitated projecting Saudi Arabia as a powerful regional leader. Two powerful national symbols, the royal family and Islam, combined to establish a solid legitimacy for the kingdom in the Middle East. The attack on Iraq meant that there was no other state in the region in a position to act as a regional stabiliser. Although Iran was potentially the most powerful country in that part of the world, it was not an Arab state. It was seen predominantly as a continental power and thus was assumed to not interact as well with the outside world. Further, Iran was surrounded by larger countries, especially the Soviet Union, and had been perceived as marginalised in relation to the Middle East as a whole and was considered unable to play any constructive role. The defeat of Iraq eliminated all external challenges that Saudi Arabia's leadership feared. In a large measure the war was also fought to prevent Iraq from becoming the dominant regional power. The coalition arrayed against Iraq testified to the undesirability of the outcome. A "Greater Iraq", having fought a war first with Iran and then with other Arab states, truly would have been in a position to influence events throughout the region. If the Iraqi military campaign in Kuwait was crushed it would leave Saudi Arabia in a dominant and unchallenged position in the region. Thus it would also act as a major link between the Middle East and the United States. This linkage would at the same time mean that Saudi Arabia, in the eyes of the United States, would become the "official spokesperson" of the Arab world. Moreover, it had further solidified its dominant position within the OPEC, due to its influential role in oil price stabilisation policies during the war. In fact ARAMCO was the unsung hero of the Gulf War, having increased oil production by more than 50 per cent to make up for lost Kuwaiti and Iraqi supplies to the international marketplace.

The end of the Cold War had made it possible for the United States to forge an international coalition against Saddam Hussein and win the Gulf War with negligible losses. However, well before the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, some features of the New International World Order began to have a significant impact on Arab politics and society. Most notable among these were the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the resultant transformation of the United States into a world power and the re-emergence of economic, ethnic and religious identities. The allies of the former Soviet Union in the region could not turn to its Russian successor for protection or support and sensing their vulnerability many of them turned towards the United States. The break-up of the former Soviet Union into independent states and the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe also facilitated the expression of deep-rooted ethnic
beliefs and religious feelings that had been suppressed for decades. The Serbs, Bosnians and Croats demonstrated their conflicting national aspirations in Yugoslavia, while Muslims in Azerbaijan and other Central Asian states sought to assert their religious identity. There was also a surge of long suppressed feelings of transnational group-identity such as that of the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Turkey and the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. The revival of ethnic and religious aspirations led to the rise of radical political movements opposing the suppressive regimes of that time. A variety of Islamic groups with conservative, liberal and radical orientations emerged in the region seeing a political role. These groups became popular among young Muslim Arabs whose problems or basic human needs were neither addressed nor satisfied by their regimes.

**Domestic Compulsions in Saudi Arabia**

The Gulf War effected noticeable changes in Saudi society. In many ways these changes led to a radical shift in the Saudi foreign policy. The kingdom was not only affected by demographic transformation but also by economic changes. Indeed increase in oil prices in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait resulted in a revenue windfall of about $13 billion. Yet Saudi economic losses outweighed its gains in the war. After including expenses for oil-spill cleanup and contributions to Turkey, Egypt and Syria, the total expenses related to the war rose to a staggering $64 billion. The war also increased the clamour for political liberalisation which led King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz to issue three statutes. These comprised the first written set of rules of government in the history of Saudi Arabia. The war further brought about a change in the ideology, which was popular in Saudi society. Pan-Arabism was replaced by Islamism which sprang up in part from hostility towards the spread of Western influence and culture. It became a potent ideology of popular dissent, especially towards American policies in the region.

Another outcome of the Gulf War was the atomisation of the Arab regional system, with each state placing its domestic interests ahead of regional or sub-regional interests and thereby undermining any hope of making organisations, such as the Arab League, an effective instrument of a collective Arab policy.

In the wake of the decline of Iraq as a power, Saudi Arabia assumed the key role of a leader in the region. The Saudi royal family stopped financial support to several regimes and Islamic groups including the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan and the Islamic Salvation

Front in Algeria realising that such assistance did not ensure unswerving support for the Saudi position on any given issue. On the contrary it found out that during the Gulf War some of the principal beneficiaries of Saudi largesse stood firmly and openly against the kingdom. This discovery, combined with the economic difficulties resulting from the conflict, led to a transformation in its role in the region. Saudi Arabia shifted from its role of a mediator between conflicting states and groups to becoming a party to such regional conflicts. Its relations with Iraq turned into deep resentment and suspicion about each other's capabilities. Yemen's opposition to the Gulf War destroyed the long-standing, cordial relationship it had previously enjoyed with Saudi Arabia. Relations with Jordan went equally sour and all Jordanian fence-mending efforts failed apparently because of the Saudi determination to punish its "disloyal" brother. As a party to conflicts with three of its Arab neighbours, Saudi Arabia, in the post-Gulf War era, adopted a more aggressive foreign policy stance, losing in the process its longstanding role as a neutral third party in inter-Arab disputes. In addition, the policy of restricting economic assistance to trusted allies, subject to strict political and economic conditions, transformed Saudi Arabia from a major financial force throughout the Middle East into a regional bank that lent limited assistance to a silent clientele. At the same time, Saudi Arabia became much more dependent on the United States for its protection from external as well as internal threats.

The Gulf War was not the only catharsis for the military dimension to become the central focus of relations in the decade after the War. Significantly a decline in the American dependency on oil from Saudi Arabia was accelerated since the Gulf War against Iraq in 1990-91. This was largely precipitated by the American buyers shifting their demand from Saudi Arabia and OPEC towards cheaper purchases in the Atlantic basin. This led to an oil glut as oil production within OPEC continued at a frenzied pace making it tougher for Saudi Arabia, which had acted as a "swing producer", to maintain discipline among its members in limiting production to stabilise prices and impose price stability.

**Emerging Arms Market**

With active conflict raging in the region and the rise in fundamentalist groups that resorted to violence for redressal of their grievances, the American defence of the House of Saud was no longer about preserving oil supplies but was more about protecting an emerging market for arms systems and big engineering projects. In about three years after the war, American
arms suppliers had sold Saudi Arabia almost $11 billion worth of arms equipment. Contracts for the biggest oilfield projects during that time, like the Shaybah structure, also went mainly to American companies. The presence of over 5000 American military personnel in the kingdom, involved in enforcing no-fly zones over various parts of a badly wounded but a still alive Iraq, confirmed the high level of enhanced cooperation between the two. In this period Saudi Arabia also emerged as one of the largest arms purchasers in the Third World. During the period from 1988 to 1995, Saudi Arabia bought $67.1 billion worth of military equipment accounting for nearly 30 per cent of all Third World arms agreements. What is more, it gave away contracts worth $17.9 billion since the beginning of 1991 to 1995. Nineteen per cent of the value of arms contracts was for lethal equipment; the largest portion (29 per cent) went for support services (repairs, rehabilitation, supply operations and training). Another major component was for the construction of military bases and facilities, accounting for the largest share (31 per cent) in the 1990s and of the second largest share (24 per cent) for the entire period.

The Problem of Terrorism

The bombings of American military facilities in Riyadh and Dahran airbase in the mid-nineties necessitated renewed cooperation between the two countries against the threats of radical fundamentalist groups. The Saudi silence during American missile attacks on Iraq in August 1996, its hosting of a deployment of US Patriot missiles together with 150 additional American military personnel were largely in response to the threats of terror from these groups. In September 2000, Saudi Arabia also bought three arms packages worth $416 million containing light armoured vehicles, anti-tank missiles and advanced communications equipment, $690 million worth for maintenance support for its F-15 fighter aircraft and $1.6 billion for inflight simulators, repair parts and other technical services for the aircraft.

War on Afghanistan and the Impact of Terrorism

The September 11 attacks dramatically re-energised the American focus on and resolve to crush terrorism. Its policies and organisational mechanisms to deal with terrorism became urgent issues to investigate. The United States had to rework all its notions, plans and strategies about war and peace, security, safety and defence, individual and society, citizenship, civil liberties, human rights, economy and politics. A single day's event had touched all facets of American life. As the United States began to hunt for the perpetrators of the crime outside, it realised the need to mobilise world opinion against terrorism. The international coalition that the United States desired to build needed Muslim countries as that would provide legitimacy and authenticity to the purpose for which it was being formed. The American President, George W. Bush, demanded the Arab countries to wrap up and prosecute terrorists in their soil. The Arab governments, led by Saudi Arabia, countered with a collection of demands for actively cooperating with the coalition. They wanted Israel to be kept out of any such coalition and insisted that resistance groups involved in the struggle against Israel must not be targeted. Further, they insisted on a concerted international campaign under the United Nations instead of any unilateral military action. In particular they rejected any attempt by he United States to broaden the anti-terror campaign into an offensive against Iran, Iraq, Libya or Sudan. General Ahmad Abdul Halim, an analyst with the Cairo Center for Middle East, explained that the Arabs had to condition their participation because the September 11 circumstances were very different from these in 1991.

The Gulf War was about restoring the sovereignty of a country which had stricken from the map by another... But now, the Arabs cannot join a coalition whose goals were unclear when at a time Israel is trying to include Palestinian organisations... in a list of terrorist groups... Before there is an anti-terrorist coalition there must be a clear definition of terrorism which does not confuse terrorist groups and resistance movements.

Saudi Arabia: Dilemmas during the War

The country with the most to lose by cooperation with Bush or in his “crusade” against terrorism was Saudi Arabia. Washington's prime suspect, Osama bin Laden, was born in the kingdom and was popular with ordinary Saudis because of his defiance of the United States. Many of the citizens in the kingdom were of the view that Washington itself was to blame for the terrorist assaults. The continued presence of thousands of American troops on Saudi soil since the 1991 war, and Washington's unstinted support for Israel had angered and alienated many Saudis and created strong anti-American feelings. Saudi Arabia was also one of only three states to have had diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime in Kabul, which was in the American hit-list for granting sanctuary to Osama bin Laden. Riyadh had close ideological, political and economic ties with the Taliban that was inspired by the Saudi Wahhabi
movement which had swept Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder of the ruling dynasty, to power in the 1920s. Many saw the Taliban as a step-son of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia.

Relations during the Afghanistan War

The considerable strain that US-Saudi relations came under after the September 11 incidents changed decades of mutual understanding over security and oil issues. Even though various reports from the Arab kingdom condemned the atrocious terror attacks and sympathised with the United States, Saudi Arabia, at first, refused to allow the United States the use of its airfields for the strike on Afghanistan. It was only after considerable pressure from Washington that it announced immediately its wholehearted support to stand against the perpetrators of the attack. Such ambiguity was only met with skepticism in the United States. Whereas other American allies responded to the attack on America with aggressive battles against hidden Al-Qaeda cells in their territories, Saudi Arabia acted as if the 15 Saudi hijackers had come, literally, out of nowhere. Yet it was also extremely difficult for the Saudis to cooperate because of the vagueness of the proposed military response. The Saudi rulers met President Bush’s talk of a “crusade” with a firm disapproval while the idea of a “long war on terror” created an atmosphere of skepticism in Saudi Arabia.

The September 11 attacks seriously compromised the close relationship between the two countries. Throughout the war on Afghanistan, the American Administration disapproved of what they perceived as Saudi indifference. Saudi Arabia had long frustrated American policy matters with its halfhearted cooperation in security matters, regional diplomacy and intelligence sharing. The United States had long allowed itself to depend considerably on the secretive royal family for information. The Bush Administration’s suspicions, after the September 11 incidents, made it exclude the Saudis from among the allies who were informed in advance of American moves to freeze the assets of terrorist organisations. The Rand Corporation, and American think-tank group, had even analysed that Saudi Arabia should be treated as an enemy, a suggestion which was endorsed by several top officials in the Administration and by Congressional members.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, persistently protested against the Bush Administration’s support to Israel. Differences also persisted on the policy towards Iraq and Iran. Bush had labelled both the nations part of an ‘axis of evil’ demanding a change in their regimes. This conflicted with the Saudi opinion which wanted to mend fences with its two neighbours. The United States believed that the war on terrorism would be won only when there were changes not only in the regimes but also in the political and social culture of the Middle East countries. Therefore it was not only demanding regime changes in Iraq and Iran but also putting pressure on Saudi Arabia to root out the terrorists in their midst and open up their system. It meant that the House of Saud had to introduce liberal Islamic values and find new political partners, something that was difficult for the Wahhabi Saudi rulers. The Bush Administration was increasingly of the view that Islamic militancy could not be contained unless and until some of its sources were identified and neutralised in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi royal family, on its part, repeatedly insisted that Saudi Arabia had made no contributions to radical Islamic groups. They also denied any knowledge of funding Al-Qaeda and other terror networks with funds meant for Islamic charities. However, American analysts believed that it was the Saudi oligarchy which had helped and financed the religious schools and mujahideen training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They increasingly suspected the Saudi connection with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda. Therefore its waffling was not surprising to them; Saudi Arabia provided little, if any, assistance to American intelligence. One big problem, according to several past and present American analysts, was the anti-American sentiments in the Saudi society.

Rise of Anti-American Feelings

It was hardly surprising that anti-American sentiments rose in the Arab world especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks. More than previous bouts of anti-Americanism, the anger seemed to have permeated all strata of Saudi society. It was not a racist feeling directed against the American people, but against the American policies. The ambiguous American stance towards Palestine also did not help matters. Although Saudi Arabia and most other regimes had solid relations with the United States, it was no secret that pro-American Arab leaders, rather than the common people, promoted these relations. The notion of an imperialist power—such animus was also the product of self-interested manipulation by various groups within the Arab
society as an excuse for political, social oppression, economic stagnation and the growth of radical fundamentalist groups like Fateh in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia; this led to growing American scrutiny in the region of the increasing anti-American sentiments.

To understand why Saudi Arabia, one of Washington’s staunchest allies, had been inculcating anti-Americanism, the murky depths of Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics have to be analysed. The kingdom, by the turn of the century, became a fragmental entity, divided between the fiefdoms of the royal family. Relations between Crown Prince Abdullah and his half-brother Prince Nayef, the Interior Minister, were visibly tense. In the United States, Abdullah cut a higher profile, but at home, in Saudi Arabia, Nayef, who controlled the secret police, cast a longer and darker shadow. Saudi Arabia was also in the throes of a crisis. The economy was unable to keep pace with the population growth while the welfare state was rapidly deteriorating and sectarian resentments were coming to the fore. These problems had been exacerbated by an upsurge in radical Islamic activism. The Saudi monarchy also functioned as the intermediary between two distinct political communities. The Westernised elite that looked to Europe and the United States as models of political development and a Wahhabi religious establishment that held up its interpretation of Islam’s golden age as a guide. Saudi Arabia’s two princes took opposing sides in this debate: Abdullah tilted towards the liberal reformers and the doctrine of Taqarub which promoted peace, downplayed jihad and encouraged democratic reform, while on the other side the clerics and Nayef took their stand on the principle of Tawhid which was closely connected to jihad and hence supported the fundamentalist groups.

Relations through the Iraqi War

The September 11 attacks increasingly made Americans question the closeness of their relations with Saudi Arabia. The Bush Administration laid clear emphasis on the necessity for reforms in the Saudi political and social system for a prosperous future for their relationship. Saudi Arabia was a crucial cog for the American plans in Iraq. It was the launch-pad for the United States-led Gulf War in 1991. Washington could launch an attack on Iraq without using bases inside Saudi Arabia, but the air campaign would have been more difficult if the United States could not use Saudi airspace. Saudi Arabia also made things difficult for the United States by refusing to allow the use of its facilities for any attack against neighbouring Iraq even if it was sanctioned by the United Nations. One of the factors weighing heavily in the Saudi mind for rejecting active cooperation was the fear of a backlash by the Al-Qaeda and a determination to mend fences with Iraq. Although the royal family was concerned about angering its population further because of its close association with the United States, its opposition to an American-led war had been mollified so much by persistent American pressure that the Saudi Government officials made an effort to take to a middle path by giving consent to the use of the Prince Sultan airbase and agreed to command-and-control, special operations and refuelling missions to be staged out of the country. They also agreed to keep delivering oil to maintain prices throughout the Iraq War. In spite of its efforts at pleasing everybody, the September 11 attacks and the subsequent Iraq War had greatly undermined the importance of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. The issue of Iraq dominated American political discussions while smaller countries like Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait rose in prominence in the American scheme of things.

Tracing US-Saudi relations to their historical origins has revealed a degree of continuity that has characterised the relationship. This stable community of interests has further been characterised by the relatively independent set of dynamics that has guided each of its four major components oil, military security, economic commercial concerns and politics. Generally both countries have attempted to keep these component sets of relations separate, but for the most part they have failed. Linkages among them have always existed. In times of crisis, these linkages have tended to become more pronounced, particularly the negative linkages. While the oil weapon used by the Saudis in 1973 linked oil to politics, Congressional debates over aircraft sale linked military issues to politics and the Arab oil embargo, and American anti-boycott tax and trade legislations linked economic decisions to political issues of the day.

A second characteristic has been the extreme swings that permeated relations in each of its component parts. The differences on the West Asian crisis and the fissures inherent in the United States being the world’s leading oil consumer and Saudi Arabia its leading supplier, the predominantly regional focus of the Saudis versus the global focus of the United States are factors that created ambiguity in relations.
The existence and perpetuation of the degrading system of what is known in official parlance as “boy orderlies” in the Police Department of the newly created State of Chhattisgarh is a flagrant violation of the human rights of children as embodied powerfully, lucidly and eloquently in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by the Government of India. It is also violative of the spirit and provisions of the Constitution of India and the general and special laws of the land with respect to Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Chhattisgarh has a total population of over 20 million of which about 45 per cent consist of members of the Scheduled Castes (about 13 per cent) and Scheduled Tribes (about 32 per cent), most of them below the poverty line. There are special constitutional provisions for their protection and development including the Special Component Plan for the former and the Tribal Sub-Plan for the latter. The issue came to light in the course of a recent visit to the State to make a rapid appraisal of the so-called “Naxalite menace” in the tribal-dominated southern parts of the State, especially in the district formerly known as the Bastar district, presently reconstituted into four police districts and three revenue districts. The appraisal, by the way, revealed that what is seen as the Naxalite problem originates from the fact that the tribal communities of Bastar have become wage labourers in their own land now occupied and used by non-tribals who not only systematically exploit them but also corner the funds and benefits meant for the development of the tribal people. We, however, are not examining this matter here.

The Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations, 1906 (as amended up to date), edited by V.S. Charate (Suvirdha Law House, Bhopal, 1944), as adopted in Chhattisgarh, states as follows (page 15):

60. Boy Orderlies—A certain number of appointments as constables may be given by Superintendents to boys under the age of 18. They are known as “boy orderlies”, and receive half the pay of an ordinary constable. In making these appointments, preference should always be given to sons and relatives of police officers, or of men who have rendered good service to Government. As soon as a boy orderly satisfies the conditions laid down in Regulation 53, he should be given preferential claim to appointment in the first vacancy that occurs.

There is no mention of ‘girl orderlies’ in the Police Regulations mentioned above! This is an extraordinary