

37. <http://www.merineews.com/article/pakistan-sri-lanka-relations-their-long-distance-amiability/15900858.shtml>
38. <http://indiaroday.intoday.in/story/pak-help-to-lanka-for-n-plant-alarms-india/1/209895.html>
39. *The Times of India*, September 13, 2014 <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Sri-spy-was-barrender-in-2009-Army-party-in-Chennai/articleshow/42391713.cms>
40. <http://www.sagsandesh.in/news/dci-completes-dredging-of-kankeasanthurai-kks-harbour-in-n-sri-lanka/>
41. 'Kankesanthurai Harbour wreck removal complete', *The Hindu*, January 18, 2012 <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/kankeasanthurai-harbour-wreck-removal-complete/article2811550.ece>
42. <http://www.railway-technology.com/news/newsindia-to-help-sri-lanka-rebuild-pallai-kankeasanthurai-railway-line>
43. Palali airport to be upgraded to international level, *Daily News*, March 15, 2013 <http://archives.dailynews.lk/2013/03/15/bus01.asp>
44. Jaffna Duraiappa Stadium To Be Developed Into An International Sports, *Tarzan Stadium* <http://www.target.lk/article.php?article=3637>
45. <http://www.news.lk/news/business/item/2615-minister-basil-inaugurates-achchuvely-industrial-estate-in-jaffna>
46. India-Sri Lanka Joint Declaration, June 9, 2010, Ministry of external Affairs, GoI, <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/4087/IndiaSri+Lanka+Joint+Declaration>
47. Sri Lanka speeds up work on power project after Rajapaksa-Modi meet, May 30, 2014 <http://www.oneindia.com/new-delhi/sri-lanka-speeds-up-work-on-power-project-after-rajpaksa-modi-meet-1456347.html>
48. India to build cultural centre in Jaffna, *The Hindu*, June 10, 2014 <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/india-to-build-cultural-centre-in-jaffna/article6098460.ece>
49. N. Manoharan, China and its Peripheries: Beijing and India-Sri Lanka Relations, Issue Brief #217, May 2013, IPCS, p.5 <http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/china-and-its-peripheries-beijing-and-india-sri-lanka-relations-217.html>
50. <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BXAww21DgFW7nCOQLaBjow/Narendra-Modi-arrives-in-Sri-Lanka-as-Final-Stop-of-His-3na.html>
51. *Ibid.*

20

India's External Security Conundrum: Complexities of Securing Peace in South Asia

Nanda Kishor M S

Most of the discourses on India's security, for a long time have begun with the phrase 'in the post-cold war era' and then there was a major event that shook the world and changed the academic discourses on security to 'after 9/11' dramatically. Needless to say, this is seen regularly even now as most of the asymmetric threats emerge from the violent non-state actors across the spectrum, who have redefined the concept of security to a large extent. The new millennium in all possible ways is likely to sustain more transformational, innovative and challenging trends than any other century in the past as there are no signs of wars among states. Though the concept of states fighting each other is slowly becoming irrelevant yet staggeringly the states are in arms race and preponderance of power remains the aim of several nations. The larger threat animately threatening the nations and keeping them in on tenterhooks is the transnational form of terrorism. This is in a way an intricate challenge for the states as the preparation to deal with the enemy is two-fold: adversarial state/s and violent non-state actors. Some in the academia believe this as an opportunity after a long time for several nations with different ideologies and traits to come together on a single platform to fight this phenomenon, whereas on the other, there seems to be a greater difficulty in defining the

new enemy, understanding them fully for executing a successful strategy. Irrespective of the stature of a nation in the world political system, it has pushed nations to converge and come to terms in managing the enemy if not eliminating. In reality, it is an implicit factor that terrorist groups or networks cannot operate in vacuum. The terrorist groups need 'sponsors', a term popularly used in counterterrorism literature referring to a nation allowing its territory to be used for carrying out terrorist activities. Sponsoring is of two types, firstly, the country and its leadership willingly and knowingly supports or does not disrupt terrorist groups and its activities. Secondly, the country is avert to terrorist activities but unable to eliminate them and continues to be a place of operation for the network. In either of the case it is called as sponsoring, as inability to act against is essentially considered as sponsoring. To discuss India's security in the region, both types of sponsoring are important. A multifaceted problem of violent non-state actors and state together posing problem to the security apparatus is a grave threat India faces in its region. Though China is on India's high security radar and falls under the larger ambit of Southern Asia, this research would limit it to South Asia as there is vast amount of literature being written about Sino-Indian security issues. Given this backdrop, to understand the precarious security scenario in which India resides needs meticulous inspection of its location, strength, weakness and status in the region.

India by her own actions or due to strategically forced actions, has to deal with the harsh reality of facing two important nations Pakistan and Bangladesh that emerged from its territory in the post-colonial twentieth century. It is far from doubt that these two share extremely uneasy relations with India. The very birth of these states has something to do with instability in the region and preparing ground for extra regional powers to play their power politics. One cannot blame these nations for the instances solely as the then international security environment also played a major role in shaping what they are today. The remaining states of the region also do not share a great rapport with India due to its geographical dominance, military strength, economic prosperity and global recognition which have invariably labeled it as a regional hegemony. Several scholars reflect the same opinion existing in the region by asserting that the sheer geopolitical size of India has "given rise to negative perceptions about India as a selfish hegemony, seeking to maximise its power at the cost of others in the neighbourhood".¹ India's new-found strength in economic sphere coupled with credentials of turning out to be

security scenario. India is not the only example in the world, nor is it only unique to the subcontinent but a common problem being faced by many nations across the world when the above mentioned attributes are identical. It becomes unique for the fact that due to time and energy it invests in resolving its regional problems is humongous and at times seen as a farfetched one. Stanley Weiss terms it as tyranny of geography.²

The recent histories of nations such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and even Maldives in the region has not been pleasant and they have been in news for all wrong reasons in international affairs. This scenario has direct implications on India's security in one or the other way. If Afghanistan is in the limelight due to Taliban and Al-Qaida leading to war on terror, Pakistan is known for being a safe heaven for terrorists and equally becoming a victim of the terrorist activities, Nepal has been in turmoil over its domestic conditions and also known for its cross border terrorist networks, Bangladesh for infighting with regard to the 1971 war memory and subsequent radical groups trying to destabilise a democratically elected party in power as it is against extreme radicalization and demonizing India, Sri Lanka for fresh religious intolerance by Sinhala groups after long struggles between LTTE and the government and Maldives for the coup and attempts to move towards radical Islam. The only exception has been Bhutan though it suffered being the land for training of some of the radical elements from the state of Assam. It would not be an exaggeration to take up terrorism as the first component of major security threat for India in the present South Asian scenario to discuss.

Terrorism and Militant Groups

It is often not surprising at all to note that since last 15 years the topic of terrorism has overtaken the state itself in the international arena. This is more so with regard to South Asia, as the shift of gravity to the East has not been limited to economy but also to security. Though the region had few groups which were internationally known such as LTTE, they could not move beyond a particular territory and were never given the title transnational in the present sense of the term. The language and ethnic related issues also limited its outreach of operations. With the advent of Taliban rule in Afghanistan and subsequent Al-Qaeda expansion to several parts of the world at once attracted the attention of the world including the United States. The attention garnered can be attributed to two reasons: firstly, the group dared attacking the United

States which never imagined to be attacked when formerly USSR could not do so. Secondly, the mix of religion and terrorist activity took it to a different level altogether. The usage of Islam and Islamic hermeneutics to justify their acts did not allow several countries to brutally attack the terrorist group unlike how they dealt with the left backed groups across the world.

Unfortunately, India has been a victim of terrorist activities for a long time but the United States accepted it only when its own soil was attacked. Pakistan has long cultivated and deployed numerous so-called Kashmiri *tanzems* (organizations) to pressure India to resolve the ongoing Kashmir dispute in Pakistan's favor.³ Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed are the two terrorists groups that have proven themselves the most capable and motivated to carry out attacks in India.⁴ Apart from this, Pakistan continues to be the place of origin and operation for several other groups that include militant groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihadi-al-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).⁵ Unfortunately, many terrorist groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh have their ideological base in Pakistan and receive either active or passive help from the agencies that are within the military and other security establishments of the Pakistanian government. One of the noted scholars on terrorism literature Jay Millan defines terrorism as a substitute of overt warfare and when diplomats fail, soldier take over, when soldier fail, terrorists take over. This is an apt situation in which Pakistan is placed right now. The nuclear conundrum post 1998 and post Kargil defeat, Pakistan has resorted to asymmetric warfare in the form of promoting terrorist organisations. These terrorist groups are also involved in supporting the groups having role in "hawala" transactions and extortion for profit like that of Dawood Ibrahim have been given sanctuary in Pakistan and are linked up with the ISI to finance terror strikes in India⁶ and these proxy networks of significance include groups like the Harkat-ul-Ansar, LeT, JeM, and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami (HuJI).⁷ What makes it more problematic and difficult to handle many a times is that of the ties of organisation like LeT with the religious, missionary organisation now known as Jamar-ul Dawa (JuD). The nature of attacks by LeT on Indian soil such as December 2000 Delhi's Red Fort to the November 2008 Mumbai has not only shaken Indian civilians but also the visitors to India. Being aware of the mighty forces India possesses, LeT tried to prove its capabilities, its linkages and outreach by attacking the financial capital of India in turn affecting the financial security of the country. The organization also carried a very definitive

on India directly; asymmetric warfare will be the strength of the contemporary battlefield to move closer to achieving its objectives. What puts India on high security alert and its forces is the fact that there is likely to be an increase in terrorist violence emanating from the world's epicenter of terrorism, and a good deal of it is likely to be directed towards India.⁸

According to Husain Haqqani, the Lashkar is determined in carrying out the mission laid out in their booklet 'Why We Are Waging Jihad?'. The eight goals are: eliminating evil and facilitating conversion to Islam; ensuring Islam's ascendance; forcing non-Muslims to pay the jaziya (historically, a tax paid by non-Muslims to Muslim rulers); assisting the weak and powerless; avenging Muslims who have been wronged; punishing the enemies of Islam for breaking promises and treaties; defending a Muslim state; and liberating what were historically Muslim territories during the Caliphate era.⁹ These are sort of apocalyptic views being put forward by a group and using religion to entice the civilian population. This is a grave security concern for India in the South Asian region essentially emanating from Pakistan. Every attack on Indian soil would be considered as a success irrespective of all the terrorists getting killed in the action as intrusion itself is consider as success in terrorism and counter-terrorism literature with regard to India. The immediate danger is the plan that has been hatched by LeT for quite some time now is the operations by Indian Mujahedeen. Indian government has to deal with a twofold problem of managing terrorist groups externally and managing homegrown terrorism. The Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the IM both have been used by LeT to create a reign of terror within India in recent times. LeT has understood that the Indian forces have become alert after 2008 Mumbai blast and it is not easy to intrude to India and carry out attacks. It has been using some of the organization in India by providing financial assistance and training to attack. The IM leader Yasin Bhatkal took over as the head on the IM after both of his brothers, Iqbal Bhatkal and Riaz Bhatkal escaped to Pakistan in 2008. He has been successful in indoctrinating Muslim youth and recruiting them in the IM and carrying out several blasts including Delhi High Court in September 2011, Mumbai in July 2011, Chinawamy Stadium in Bengaluru in April 2010, German Bakery in February 2010, Ahmedabad in 2008 and twin blasts in Hyderabad in August 2007 amongst others.¹⁰ Bhatkal has been arrested and his arrest has opened up a can of worms which essentially establish Pakistan's project to destabilize India's security and induce threat.

It will be interesting to note that a country like Nepal which is culturally

close to India has been one of the biggest security threats to India. This is not in comparison to the type of role played by Pakistan but Nepal has been used as a transit point for most of the people who are recruited by Pakistani terrorist organisations. The free border arrangement between Nepal and India has been thoroughly used by Pakistani terrorist organisations. The geopolitical conditions of Terai is favorable to facilitating criminal smuggling activities and housing safe havens; conditions that have attracted the interest and followers of LeT.¹¹ Without a stable government and decision making process, Nepal has figured in the failed state list produced by the United States government. After LeT was implicated in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, attention turned to their Terai operations. Based upon the confession of the sole surviving attacker, India demanded that Nepal take swift action against several of the traders. Aslam Ansari (Pakistan) and Nasim Ansari (Nepal) were arrested in the border town of Birgunj in December 2008 by police due to pressure from India and Interpol for their suspected roles in funding LeT. With the arrest of Yasin Bharkal on 28 August 2013 by the Bihar Police in a joint operation with the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Abdul Karim Tunda of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) from the India-Nepal border on 16 August 2013 has only proved the point beyond doubt that Nepal has ended up becoming a sponsor of terrorism.

The case of Bangladesh is much more peculiar as the terrorist activities go up depending on the regime in rule. It has been recorded and accepted widely that whenever BNP has been in power the radical groups have advantage. This has been evident on several occasions and Sriradha Durra opines that the violent outburst against Hindus, who are mainly supporters of the Awami League, in the aftermath of the BNP coalition victory in the 2001 election, reflected not only the underlying tension that prevailed between the two main political parties in Bangladesh but also with India. Though on several occasions Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had raised the concern of *Talibanisation* of Bangladesh, her intervention could not achieve anything as the then ruling party was in favour of radical groups. To prove this point beyond doubt, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led coalition government, headed by Khaleda Zia, provided safe heavens to Indian insurgent groups in the North-East India with a view to keeping India internally engaged. It is only after Sheikh Hasina has been in power that India has been in a much more comfortable position. Needless to say, even now when the Bangladeshi government is making all its attempts to cooperate with India, there are radical groups which have crossed rivers with Dalits and other minorities

for opportunities to attack India. Bangladesh continues to be a greater threat to security of India as the pro Al-Qaeda organizations of Pakistani origins supported by the ISI such as the LeT, HuJI, and Harkat ul Mujahideen (HuM) try operating through Bangladesh, help illegal migration into Assam and West Bengal, and arrange the flow of funds from Wahabi charity organizations in Saudi Arabia to the radical groups. Several militant Islamist groups that exist in Bangladesh, like Jam'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), the Jagrata Muslim Janara Bangladesh (JMJB), the Harkatul-Jihad-Islami (HuJI), the Islami Chharrat Shibir, and the Hizb-ul-Tahri, are always a threat to India. The Sheikh Hasina government is a great support to the Indian Government but sustaining her in the seat of power is not India's duty but it can facilitate by taking positive decisions concerning Bangladesh from migration, water sharing, and construction of dams to addressing climate changes issues amicably.

Other Security Concern

Apart from terrorism, there are several other security issues India needs to divert its attention to. Though the change of guard in Sri Lanka is a welcome scenario for India compared to that of a strong headed Rajapaksa, there is no guarantee that it would work in favour of India. Rajapaksa was seen as a person who would play the China card whenever there would be an adversarial decision taken against Sri Lanka by India. There have been numerous incidents in the Palk Strait of the Sri Lankan Navy firing and imprisoning Indian fisherman who use mechanized trawlers and practice illegal fishing methods that destroy Sri Lankan fishing boats. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe has come up with an unusually hard and provocative statement suggesting that Indian fishermen would be shot if they were to intrude into Sri Lankan waters.¹² India wants an amicable solution to the fishermen problem in the traditional waters of Palk Bay as it has all the potential to disturb the internal politics of India. The internal political dilemma is in much better condition compared to that of the previous regime of Manmohan Singh. The recent special committee and a cabinet subcommittee set up by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe on the Chinese funded US\$ 1.5 billion Colombo Port City Project has been a welcome gesture as India had its own security concerns as a large portion of cargoes bound for India are transhipped through Colombo port. During the previous Sri Lankan administration, mistrust between India and Sri Lanka on regional security

subsequent support for a maritime trade route that would permit Chinese submarines to dock along the Sri Lankan coastline was expected. The Chinese government has changed regional security scenario and India would not want this use of infrastructure put in place by China against Indian interests. In the Annexure of the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 India and Sri Lanka have agreed that "Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka would not be made available for military use to any country in a manner which is prejudicial to India's interest." India trusts that Colombo would abide by this provision seriously.¹³ As it is too early to assess the behavioural pattern of the new government, Sri Lanka continues to be a security concern for India.

Afghanistan is another security concern for India even though India has a better image among Afghans due to its development activities. The last instance of attacking the Indian consulate in Herat on 23 May 2014 came as a shocking one. India would go through a real problematic situation once the withdrawal of the US and NATO led troops take place completely. Though several academicians and experts opine that such complete withdrawal will not happen, if happens then certainly it is not in India's interest. Due to the West led groups keeping vigilance, some of the Pakistan based militant groups are unable to operate in Kashmir through Afghan groups. The new president, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, though not avert to India, he is also not seen as a great friend of India compared to his predecessor Karzai. His visits to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan only assert that he is much into reconciliation than confronting the real problems of his country. A series of Pakistani officials visited Kabul including the army chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif and Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, the new head of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the powerful military spy agency. If Ashraf Ghani is making effort to reduce visibility of Taliban through Pakistan, nothing can be equivalent to that of his irrationality. Even the Afghan people know the intentions of Pakistan in long run. These events only put India in a difficult situation. Some assert that Pakistan's ultimate goal is that Afghanistan provides Pakistan strategic depth against India. Pakistan's Defense Secretary stated in January 2014 that they would not accept a robust role for India in Afghanistan as international forces wind down involvement in Afghanistan. India's goals are to deny Pakistan "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan the ability to block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond, and to prevent militants in Afghanistan from attacking Indian targets in

Afghanistan. Even if all the countries decide to go ahead with the project, there is always a threat during the operational part by extremist groups.

Maldives is another significant country in India's maritime security. If India wants its footprint in a firm manner in the region, greater attention needs to be given to the Maldives archipelago. For India, Maldives' location in the Indian Ocean and close to its southern tip makes it a strategically significant country. The report of increasing Chinese presence in the Maldives is a matter of anxiety for India. Both the countries have agreed to "strengthen cooperation to enhance maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean Region through joint patrolling and aerial and maritime surveillance, exchange of information, capacity building and the development of an effective legal framework against piracy".¹⁵ The internal politics and the coup tendency is a real security concern for India. It has serious implications on India's economic interest too. The GMR issue was one such example of strained relations. The trilateral cooperation between India-Maldives-Sri Lanka can be best served if the security issues in the Indian Ocean Region are solved amicably and for that Maldives becomes one of the primordial interests for India. A stable democracy in Maldives is in India's interest and for this to happen, India needs regularly interact with the island nation. India also needs to make sure that Maldives does not become safe heaven for jihadi activities. It was known for long that Maldivian students had been enticed into attending madarasas in Pakistan since the late seventies-or from around the time the ISI began its 'zero option' unconventional war on India.¹⁶ Recent visit of the Maldivian president is a welcome sign and his gesture of India first would help in India taking adequate measures to secure its position in the Indian Ocean.

Apart from terrorist networks and attacks on India, there are other security concerns for India with regard to Pakistan. India has non-traditional security issues with Pakistan with regard to the river sharing. The energy demands of India has been driving it to go for hydroelectric projects on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers and also the much needed Kishanganga project. All of these have been opposed by Pakistan. Pakistan had moved for arbitration against India under the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 that regulates the use of waters in the shared rivers-on 17 May 2010. There were three major appeals filed by Pakistan at International Court of Arbitration (ICA): first, the flow of water to be at a minimum of 10 to ideally 100 cumecs towards Pakistan's Neelum-Jhelum River; second, to permit Pakistan to have an access of monitoring of water; and last, restrict India to divert the water to its

Court of Arbitration has allowed India to go ahead with construction of the 330-MW Kishanganga hydro-electric project in North Kashmir which was under dispute with Pakistan. Pakistan has serious concerns with regard to the design of the project. Pakistan also claims that India is exploiting its base in Afghanistan to cause problems in Baluchistan and in Pakistan's restless tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Similar accusations proliferate about India's expanding presence in Iran, especially its 'listening post' in Zahedan in Iran's Sistan-o-Baluchistan province, abutting Pakistan's own restive Baluch province.¹⁷ Though many of the allegations are made against India due to the frustration Pakistan is being unable to handle of the firm footprint of India in Afghanistan and Central Asia, it has the ability to disturb India's peace by resorting to asymmetric methods on which India needs to be cautious.

With regard to Bangladesh, illegal immigration continues to be a perennial problem. The illegal migration poses multidimensional problem. Most of the academicians are of the opinion that there is a possibility that between 10 and 35 million Bangladeshis are illegally residing in India. The Centre for Women and Children Studies based in Bangladesh estimated in 1998 that 27,000 Bangladeshis had been forced into prostitution in India. This is one of the major security concerns for India as it leads to considerable economic burden for India and equally endangers national security in a severely threatened global atmosphere of terrorism. Though often it is criticized that the illegal immigration situation is overemphasized with the security discourse due to intelligent agencies, one cannot deny the role of some illegal migrants in several blazes that have taken place in India due strong radicalization process by Pakistan in Bangladesh. There are several internal security issues that are related to the illegal immigrant problem such as the ongoing conflict between Bodos and Bengali speaking Muslims from Bangladesh. It is essentially political, economic and security concerned issues. Between 2007 and 2012, Muslim immigrants had migrated in large numbers from Dhubri to Kokrajhar district especially to Gosaigaon sub-division. This created enormous pressures on agriculture land, one of the vital means of livelihood for indigenous communities.¹⁸ The external problems with Bangladesh have direct influence on some of the major problematic regions of India and internal security issues. The extremist groups from the northeast found safe heavens in Bangladesh for a long time. It was only during Sheikh Hasina's era that things have become better due to her pro-India policies which led Bangladesh handing over, Ranjan

Front of Bodoland (NDFB-ATF) to India. In similar fashion a number of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) leaders were arrested and subsequently handed over to the Indian authorities. Some of the top ULFA leaders who were handed over to the Indian authorities were 'general secretary', Arbinda Rajkhowa, deputy commander in-chief Raju Baruah, 'foreign secretary' Sasdhar Choudhury, and 'finance secretary' Chitranab Hazarika on 1 May 2010.¹⁹ To sum it up, the security concerns with Bangladesh range from illegal migration, child and women trafficking, drug trafficking and support to Indian extremists by providing safe place to stay.

In case of Nepal, there are serious issues of anti-India feeling among the people. India had to go through a typical dilemma of being suspected by monarchy for supporting groups favouring democratic regime in Nepal and on the other hand being accused of supporting the monarchy clandestinely to come back to power. India has been constantly accused of working for an instable Nepal. The open border between the nations has been a major issue of security concern as it is used by terrorists, smugglers, drug peddlers (*ganjia* from Nepal and *charras* from India), smuggling of small arms from both sides, etc. Illegal armed groups operating in the Madheshi region, and organised criminal gangs take advantage of the open border and take shelter on either side to evade the law enforcement agencies of respective countries. Apart from that, of late, some religious fundamentalist groups have increased their activities along the border region. This could pose a serious security challenge both to India and Nepal in future.²⁰ The recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Nepal has charred a fresh chapter in Indo-Nepal relations. Both countries endorsed new developmental projects, showed their willingness to improve the peace and security at border, promised to improve border infrastructure, and expressed concern over the slow pace of implementation of many projects.²¹ As these developments are too early to judge, the security concerns have to be taken up by India with Nepal regularly.

Bhutan being a landlocked Himalayan country, has been one of the most important strategic location to India. Though 'Operation All Clear' against ULFA, NDFB and KLO was most successful in 2003, the story has not ended there. According to some reports, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) have been training the Communist Party of Bhutan (MLM) and its two wings, Bhutan Tiger Force and United Revolutionary Youth of Bhutan. CPB-MLM aims to overthrow the regime in Bhutan, and has opposed the democratic elections

jungles of Bhutan as a transit route to enter Arunachal Pradesh.²² The Chinese assertion along the Bhutan border is also equally alarming. The amalgamation of security threats posed by extremist groups from India and China using Bhutan's territory is the real concern for India.

It is rightly pointed out that there are causal relations between managing a region and global aspirations of becoming a major power for India. India aspires to be a power that has to be recognized with its economic might assisted with larger population being youth. India certainly needs to move beyond managing its neighbour to lead its neighbours. Its strategic vision has to overcome some of its inherited problems of clinging onto wait and watch approach to 'be first and lead'. It's far from doubt that India has never imposed its credential of being the largest democracy on its South Asian neighbours and that image restrains it from taking bolder steps. It is high time that India advocates some of its credentials to its neighbours and equally learn important ones from others. From security point of view, India needs to be pro-active as signaling alone will not fetch anything. One of the important examples of action-oriented decision is that of calling off the foreign secretary level talks with Pakistan after Pakistani High Commissioner Abdul Basit's meeting with Hurriyat leader Shabir Shah was a grave concern for India. This sent a strong message in action which was not anticipated by Pakistan. One cannot agree with statements implying that India does not want to get struck with South Asia's unending problems but moved ahead and play a larger global role. However problematic it is, India should first give its priority to its South Asian neighbours as it is not only a security issue but also a moral duty. If India wants to be part of setting normative standards in international politics, then it has to carry its South Asian neighbours all along. Shying away from a problem is certainly not the character of a major power but to reconcile and work on newer solutions with new approaches to the problem. Except for Pakistan, in the present scenario of 2015 South Asia, India is expected to lead and carve a place for South Asia as a region in the world politics. There is a fresh confidence that has come in the South Asian neighbours with the election of Narendra Modi to the government and his clear policy of 'South Asia first'.

The time is ripe to think of a regional security complex and remove the fears long persisting among neighbours on India as a nuclear nation with superior military power. The regular issue of non-cooperation from Pakistan would surface for sure, but one can hope that by taking other remaining

is the only way to coerce Pakistan to fall in line. India's security also essentially depends on how it deals with its neighbours with mutual trust and respect. The ad-hoc fashion of dealing with neighbours needs to be transformed into 3C's: Communicate, Cooperate and Converge. India is capable of helping and subsequently presenting its concerns, priorities and expectations from the South Asian neighbours. So far, India has been waiting for conducive regimes to come in the neighbourhood to be in a better position, but the time has come to create advantageous environment through its forward looking decisions and support to convert any regime to a conducive one. If India's national security and interest is the high priority to have peace in India, the best option is to lead from the front, rework on the economic model to bring prosperity to the region and place a consensual model of progress to place South Asia distinctly on the world map. There is a necessity for India to move beyond the rhetoric's to action if it is serious in securing peace.

REFERENCES

1. M. Bisht, "India-Bhutan relations in the next two decades." In Rumeel Dahiya, & Ashok K Behuria (eds.), *India's Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012, pp. 137-62.
2. B. Chellaney, 'India: Regional Security Challenges', in Wilhelm Hofmeister (ed.), *Security Politics in Asia and Europe* (pp. 157-176). Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010.
3. C. Fair, Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 37 (2), 2013, pp. 259-90.
4. M. Daniel, *Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation*. The United States of America: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010.
5. Sharma, S.K., & Behera, A., *Militant Groups in South Asia*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014, p. 320.
6. P. Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
7. A. Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*. London: Allen Lane, 2008.
8. S. Kalyanaraman, Asymmetric Warfare: A View from India, *Strategic Analysis*, 36(2), 2012, pp. 193-197.
9. H. Haqqani, The Ideology of South Asian Jihadi Groups. In Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, & Eric Brown (Eds.), *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 1, Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005.
10. A. Behera, Radicalisation in Bangladesh: Challenges Ahead. *Journal of Defence Studies*, 5(2), 2011, pp. 138, 146.
11. J. Miltkian, *Illicit Trading in Nepal: Fueling South Asian Terrorism*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2009.
12. Sharma, S.K., & Behera, A., *Militant Groups in South Asia*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014, p. 320.
13. N. Manoharan, *China and its Peripheries: Beijing and India-Sri Lanka Relations*, 2013. Retrieved March 10, 2015, from <http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/china/china-and-its-peripheries-beijing-and-india-sri-lanka-relations-217.html>

14. K. Karzaman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 2015, Retrieved March 10, 2015, from <http://fas.org/sgp/letters/row/RL30588.pdf>
15. G. Arvind, India and Maldives: Ties Must Be Consolidated, 2014, Retrieved March 10, 2015, from http://www.idsa.in/policybrief/IndiaandMaldives_agupra_130113.html
16. S. Moorthy, India and Maldives Towards Consolidation, 2010, Retrieved March 10, 2015, from http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB145-Maldives-Sathyamoorthi.pdf
17. C. Fair, Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 37(2), 2013, pp. 259–90.
18. N. Goswami, Bodo violence: Contest for power and territory, 2014, Retrieved March 10, 2015, from http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Bodoviolence_ngoswami_090514.html
19. A. Behera, Deradicalisation in Bangladesh: Challenges Ahead, *Journal of Defence Studies*, 5(2), 2011, pp. 138–146.
20. Nihar Nayak, Issues and Concerns in India-Nepal Relations. In Rumlal Dahiya, & Ashok K Behuria (Eds.), *India's Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012, pp. 137–62.
21. T.R. Wani, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi Visit to Nepal: Renewing Relations. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 5(2), 2015, pp. 1-2.
22. M. Bishr, India-Bhutan relations in the next two decades. In Rumlal Dahiya, & Ashok K Behuria (Eds.), *India's Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012, pp. 137–62.

Index

- Abbott, Tony, Australian Prime Minister, 3, 29
- Act East Policy (AEP), 18, 27-28, 99, 183, 186, 189, 192
- Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), 250
- Adhikari, Shekhar, 209
- Advanced Air Defence (AAD), 257
- Afghan Civil War, 41
- Afghan War, 33, 238
- Afghanistan, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 198, 238, 295, 300
- Pakistan Double Game in, 38
- APFak, 41
- Talibanisation, 41
- Agni-V*, 257
- abhinava*, 138
- al Qaeda, 33, 38, 147, 173, 245, 295, 299
- Algeria, 236
- All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), 150
- Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 165
- Andaman Nicobar Command (ANCO), 169
- Antony, A.K., former defence minister, 4
- APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), 24, 126
- AQIS, 147
- Arabian Gulf, 236
- Arabian Sea, 126, 149
- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 126
- ASEAN, 5, 130, 142, 182, 184, 189, 192, 271
- ASEAN-India vision document 2020, 186
- ASEM (Asia-Europe Summit Meeting), 126
- Asia, 10, 26-27, 103, 106, 124-25, 129-30, 133-35, 139, 141, 159, 169, 187, 192, 248, 256, 266, 274, 288
- Asia-Pacific, 130-32, 134, 189, 259, 265, 272
- Australia, 4, 19, 265-66, 268, 271-72
- Automatic Identification System (AIS), 170
- B4B ('Bharat for Bhutan' and 'Bhutan for Bharat'), 88
- Bangladesh Border Guard (BGB), 69
- Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 298
- Bangladesh, 35, 47-48, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, 181, 182, 222, 295
- Arsenic Contamination, 56
- Climate Change, 60
- Cyclones and Storm Surges, 60
- Drought and Salinity, 55
- Flood, 54
- Pollution, 59
- Population and Poverty, 52
- Trans-boundary Water Sharing Issue, 57
- Water Crisis, 53
- Wetlands, 57
- Bazariguru chhu*, 83
- BCIM, 11
- Bhadrauni, Sanjeev, 124
- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 9, 18, 77
- Bhutan, 2, 18, 78, 81, 159, 303
- 102nd National Day, 82
- Bhutan-China border, 83, 86
- 11th Five Year Plan, 88
- Bhutto, Benazir, 241
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 236-37
- Islamic Socialism, 237
- Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreement (BIPA), 188
- BIMSTEC, 80, 82, 87, 126, 189